

Risks to the US

2. Public or private disclosures to the USSR involves significant risks to the US without any guarantee that the end result would be to its advantage. Once the subject was raised the Soviets might respond in a relatively moderate fashion and try to learn as much as possible about the US program. If satellite reconnaissance were related to the question of disarmament and inspection, the Soviets would probably press for a complete technical examination of the use of satellite photography, offering to exchange photos. Any such exchange would not only clear up some Soviet doubts about the satellite program but could also reveal that the USSR may have failed to detect. This type of exchange would be to the net advantage to the USSR.\*

2a. Even a very general disclosure to the Soviets risks counter moves. Official confirmation of satellite reconnaissance could increase pressures on the Soviet leaders to consider such countermeasures as deliberate deception and camouflage. It might also provide further incentive for the Soviets to offset US targeting information by speeding up the hardening of missile sites and deploying more mobile systems.

2b. There is still a chance that the USSR, if confronted with US confirmation of satellite reconnaissance, would feel obliged to react adversely. They would find it difficult to condone a US policy

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\* If some photography is revealed, some of the risks to the US could be mitigated if no photography of the USSR is used, and only low KH-4 photography with little photo-interpretation of military installations supplied. This, of course, reduces the impact of the disclosure on the USSR.

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of photographing Soviet military installations. As a result, they might press for an international agreement to outlaw the use of outer space for intelligence purposes, on the calculation that the US would lose much more than the USSR. It is also possible that they would threaten and eventually attempt to interfere with the US effort, though the chances of this are less in view of the Soviet program.

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